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court's finding that the widow did not have a life estate, the Illinois Supreme Court
was careful, however, not to overrule the White case, saying that the rule there enunci-
ated would have controlled if the reservation to the spouse had been made by exapress
words. The deed in the instant case provided: "The .... grantors hereby expressly
reserve unto themselves the use of the above conveyed premises ..... "
Procedure-Use of Class Actions in Restrictive Covenant Cases-[Illinois].-An
instrument embodying a restrictive covenant against Negro occupation of property
in the Washington Park subdivision in Chicago% contained a provision that it should
not be effective unless the owners of ninety-five percent of the foot-frontage in the
proposed restricted area should sign. In a prior suit, Burke v. Kleiman,2 brought against
a signing property owner by another signer on behalf of herself and all others who
would be injured by breach of the covenant, it had been stipulated that the requisite
ninety-five percent had signed the agreement, and an injunction had been obtained
against the breach. In the instant suit to enforce the covenant, the defendants' proved
at the trial that owners of only fifty-four percent of the frontage had signed; but the
trial court held that, the defendants having been represented by the plaintiff in the
previous class suit, the prior adjudication was res judicata.4 On appeal to the Illinois
Supreme Court, held, affirmed. Lee v. Hansberry.s
The first of several arguments indicating that the decision in the Lee case 6 is an im-
proper application of the doctrine of res judicata, is based on a criticism of the court's
view that Burke v. Kleinan7 was a representative action. Since the instant case is ap-
parently the first adjudication as to the applicability of the representative device to
the enforcement of a restrictive covenant, the propriety of using the representative
device, even where there is a validly created restrictive covenant, may well be ques-
tioned. Abrogating as it does the individual's right to his day in court, the class action
can usually be justified only on the ground that joinder of the parties would otherwise
have been necessary.8 But it has been expressly held that the joinder of all parties to
a covenant is not required; each individual may bring suit in his own name.9 Conse-
x The agreement covered property in practically all of the area between 6oth and 63d Streets,
and South Park and Cottage Grove Avenues.
2 Burke v. Kleinan, 277 Ill. App. 59 (1934).
3 One of the defendants was the husband of the plaintiff in Burke v. Kleiman. He had been
an officer in the property owners' association at the time the first suit was brought, but was
no longer an officer at the time of the second suit. There was evidence that at the time he
ceased to be an officer of the association, he said he would "put Negroes in every block."
4 Following Burke v. Kleiman, the covenant had also been enforced in two other suits in
the Superior Court of Cook Countyin Cook v. Yondorf, 34 Sup. Ct., Cook County 1261 (i936)
and Penoyer v. Cohn, 34 Sup. Ct., Cook County 16816 (1936).
5 372 Ill. 369, 24 N.E. (2d) 37 (939).
6 Ibid. 7 Burke v. Kleiman, 277 Ill. App. 5i9 (1934).
8 Moore and Cohn, Federal Class Actions, 32111. L. Rev. 307, 314 (1937): "The 'true class
suit' is one wherein, but for the class action device, the joinder of all interested persons would
be essential;" Blume, The "Common Questions" Principle in the Code Provisions for Repre-
sentative Suits, 3o Mich. L. Rev. 878, 897 (1932).
9 Linzeev. Mixer, ioi Mass. 512 (i869);Westemv. MacDermott, L.R. 2 Ch. App. 72 (1867).
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quently there is not the same necessity for a class action, as exists in the cases of suits
by or against an unincorporated association,1° by a stockholder for a wrong done to
the corporation, = or by a class within an unincorporated association against the asso-
ciation. 2 The mere fact that the signers are numerous does not justify the representa-
tive suit, unless some necessity can be shown for binding all of them by the decree.
It may be urged that such justification for binding all the signers exists in the fact
that the effective operation of the covenant would create something in the nature of a
zoning ordinance, thus making a situation analogous to that in which a suit brought
by a single taxpayer, suing in the public rightx3 binds all taxpayers.'4 Doubtless the
fact that much of the effectiveness of a restrictive covenant depends upon its being
enforced throughout the restricted area does create a concern in its enforcement so
general as to be analogous to a public concern; s and if the validity of the covenant can
be tested in a single suit wherein all signers are bound, it may be argued that the added
certainty thus given to each individual property owner justifies an occasional injustice
to any particular individual. It must be noted, however, that the extent to which the
enforceability of the entire covenant can possibly be determined in a representative
proceeding is quite limited. The peculiarly personal defenses, such as fraud in obtain-
ing the signature, laches in enforcement, and abrogation of the covenant by mortgage
foreclosure, could not of course be determined in a representative proceeding. And it
is doubtful whether even the issue of "change of condition" could be determined in a
class suit: if the court, in determining whether the conditions have changed, looks only
at the surroundings of the individual property owner,' 6 the determination could not
affect more than the single property owner. If, of course, the court considers the sur-
roundings of the entire restricted area, 7 then the determination might be made in a
representative suit.
The only matter, then, as to which a representative suit would be both possible and
1o Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 78 N.E. 753 (igo6). In many states by statute, and
occasionally by decision, an unincorporated association may sue and be sued in its own name,
88 A.L.R. 164, 66 (1934).
" Willoughby v. Chicago junction Railways & Union Stockyards Co., 5o N.J. Eq. 656, 25
Atl. 277 (X892).
"Smith v. Swormstedt, i6 How. (U.S.) 288 (1853).
'3 Greenberg v. Chicago, 256 Il. 213, 218, 99 N.E. 1039 (1912): "There is no reasonable or
logical distinction between a suit brought in behalf of all taxpayers, and a suit brought in the
name of the people by relation as citizens .......
'4 Harmon v. Auditor of Public Accounts, 123 I1. 122, r3 N.E. i6i (1887).
"People v. Whittaker, 254 Ill. 537, 98 N.E. 967 (1912) (legality of creation of drainage dis-
trict may be tested in representative proceeding). It must be noted, however, that an actual
zoning ordinance attempting what the covenant in the instant case does would be unconsti-
tutional, Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 6o (1917).
'6 Clark v. Vaughan, 131 Kan. 438, 292 Pac. 783 (i93o), noted in 44 Harv. L. Rev. 989
(193I) (individual, alleging thathis own surroundings had changed, allowed to break covenant,
although there was no showing that conditions had changed within the restricted area. The
result is to allow a gradual encroachment toward the center of the restricted area).
'7 Frick v. Foley, I02 N.J. Eq. 43o, 141 Atl. 172 (1928) (mere fact that person on edge of
restricted area was close to Negroes not a "change of condition," there being no change within
the restricted area).
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advantageous'8 is that which is in dispute in the present litigation: was there ever an
operative instrument of covenant? Even the limitation of the effect of the class suit
to the determination of that single issue does not justify the instant case in approving
the use of the class suit device. The advantage to be gained by determining that issue
in a representative suit is but slight; certainly the point thus decided has not the signifi-
cance of the questions put at rest in the taxpayer cases, where the validity of bonds' 9 or
of public projects2o or the legality of public payments- may be dependent upon the
conclusive determination of the issues. Furthermore, the limitation of the effect of the
representation to the determination of the execution issue does not overcome the diffi-
culty raised by cases holding that a representative decree cannot be binding upon those
members of the "class" whose interests are in fact adverse to those of the representa-
tive.2 While there may be said to be a common interest in the determination of
whether or not a valid instrument ever existed, it must be noted that the suit is
brought, not to determine that single issue, but to enforce the covenant; and that the
interests as to the enforcement of the covenant have in fact become adverse. And
further, this limitation of the effect of the class suit does not entirely dispose of the
difficulty raised by the fact that the instant case amounts to a holding that one person
may be bound as against other persons against whom he has never by representation
or otherwise occupied an adversary position before a court. Such a result is not per-
mitted in other multi-party litigation where parties were on the same side of a case
by actual joinder;'2 and the fact that there is so little authority on the point in repre-
sentative litigation4 would seem of itself to be an indication that it has not been con-
is There would seem to be no advantage to be gained from the determination in a class suit
of issues such as the legality of the restraint; the force of stare decisis after determination in a
single-party suit would seem to be, practically, as effective.
9 Harmon v. Auditor of Public Accounts, 123 Ill. 122, 13 N.E. i6i (1887); cf. Loesnitz v.
Seelinger, 127 Ind. 422, 25 N.E. 1037 (i8go).
20 Ellison v. Hodges, 71 Okla. i6, 174 Pac. 1O89 (I9x8); People v. Whittaker, 254 Ill. 537,
98 N.E. 967 (1912).
2" Dal Pino v. Board of Com'rs, I5 Ill. App. 245 (I9O9), aff'd 245 Ill. 496, 92 N.E. 291
(19IO).
22 Lyons v. Coolidge, 89 Ill. 529 (1878); Mail v. Maxwell, 107 Ill. 554 (1883); cf. Lee v. In-
dependent School District of Iowa City, 149 Iowa 345, 128 N.W. 533 (igio). The reason, as
stated in Story's Equity Pleadings § X26 (ioth ed. 1892): "In all these classes of cases, it is
apparent, that all the parties stand, or are supposed to stand, in the same situation, and have
one common right, or one common interest, the operation and protection of which will be for
the common benefit of all, and cannot be to the injury of any." This quotation from Story is
in Hale v. Hale, 146I1. 227,33 N.E. 858 (1893), and Weberpals v. Jenny, 300 Ill. 145, 133 N.E.
62 (1921).
2 J Freeman, Judgments § 422 (5 th ed. 1925): "Parties to a judgment are not bound by
it, in a subsequent controversy between each other, unless they were adversary parties in the
original action." Gouwens v. Gouwens, 222 Ill. 223, 78 N.E. 597 (i9o6) (determination, made
in mortgage foreclosure proceeding, wherein mortgagor and creditor were made defendants,
that creditor had a lien on property, not conclusive in subsequent litigation between mort-
gagor and creditor); Victor Oil Co. v. Drum, 184 Cal. 226, 193 Pac. 243 (1920).
24 In Haese v. Heitzeg, i59 Cal. 569, 114 Pac. 836 (1g1), the rule of the co-party cases
appears to have been applied to a set of facts in which it would have been much easier to make
an exception to the rule than it is in the instant case. In that case, an owner of land who was a
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sidered proper to allow a class suit at all in a situation wherein one of the main benefits
to be derived from the use of the class device will require that one person be bound as
against other persons with whom he has never stood in an adversary relation.25 At
any rate, the "adversary party" difficulty suggests the plausibility of further limiting
the effect of the representation in the situation presented, to the prevention of further
suits brought against the defendant in the event he is successful in the first suit
brought against him.26
In the second place, since parties bound only by representation are permitted a
wider scope of collateral attack than parties to the record, in that they may attack
collaterally where they can show that the representative did not in good faith7 repre-
party plaintiff by representation in a suit declaring an assessment invalid, was held not bound
by the judgment, as to land he later bought at an assessment sale. But see People v. Whittaker,
254 111. 537, 98 N.E. 967 (1912), a case in which an adjudication in a suit brought by a land-
owner in one drainage district against the officer of a second drainage district, to test the le-
gality of the creation of the drainage districts, is held binding upon a landowner in the second
district when he brings suit against the officer.
2s A possible solution of the "adversary party" difficulty is suggested by a case (Willoughby
v. Chicago junction Railways & Union Stockyards Co., 5o N.J. Eq. 656, 668, 25 Atl. 277, 282
(1892)) in which it is stated that if a stockholder was not represented by the stockholder-
plaintiff in the former case, then he must have been represented by the corporation-defendant.
But note that in the Willoughby situation, the same act (the making of a contract by the cor-
poration) was in controversy in both cases; the sole question was whether the former adjudica-
tion as to the legal relations arising from the act was binding on the stockholder in the later
case. In the Burke case, on the other hand, it cannot be contended that the act complained of
(the leasing of certain premises to a Negro) can possibly have any effect on the legal relations
of other persons who, under the theory of the Willoughby case, would be represented by the
defendant. As to such other persons, the adjudication would be only a declaratory judgment:
it would merely decree what legal relation would result in the future if one of those persons
should lease or sell to a Negro. Cf. South East Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Scoville, 298111. App.
92, 18 N.E. (2d) 584 (1938) (tax warrant holders not allowed to maintain class suit against
board of education, in view of fact that some of warrant holders have already been paid a larger
amount than will be available for all; consequently some of those who are within the class
would have to be made defendants).
26 This seems to have been the reason, for instance, for the defendants' request that all
members of the plaintiff class be bound, in Whitney v. Mayo, is Ill. 252 (1853). The dissenting
opinion in the instant case states that the instant case is an overruling of the Whitney case,
but it is suggested that there is no such overruling: that the Whitney case holds only that the
plaintiff will have to bring his action as a representative action, not that the plaintiff will have
actually to join all the others.
Nor would there appear to be any difficulty in holding that a decree binds those represented
for one purpose, but not for other purposes. See St. Louis, I.M. & S.R. Co. v. McKnight, 244
U.S. 368 (i917), where it is held that the mere binding all shippers, in a representative suit,
by an injunction, does not give the same court authority to determine the restitution cases of
shippers bound only by representation, where the injunction is found to have been erroneously
issued.
27 Mere negligence or incompetency in failing to raise all the issues probably does not give
ground for collateral attack, Schmidt v. Modem Woodmen of America, 261 111. App. 276
(i931); Harmon v. Auditor of Public Accounts, 123 Ill. 122, 13 N.E. 161 (1887); Greenberg v.
Chicago, 256 111. 213, 99 N.E. 1039 (1912). But see Lindsay v. Allen, i12 Tenn. 637, 657,
82 S.W. 171, 175 (19o4), where it is said that "gross negligence equivalent to a fraudulent sur-
render of rights" will open the door to collateral attack.
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sent them, it might be argued that the presence of the stipulation in the Burke case
should have given the defendants in the Lee case ground for collateral attack. The de-
fendants were unable, however, to convince the court that there had been actual fraud
or collusion; and mere consent on the part of the representative probably does not open
the door to collateral attack.28
But it is suggested that there is a third ground upon which the defendants in the
instant case may attack the prior decree collaterally; a ground independent of any
holding as to whether a restrictive covenant may be imposed in a representative pro-
ceeding, and independent of any effect to be given to consent, fraud, or collusion. It is
true that so far as parties before the court were concerned the court's determination
that there was an operative agreement of covenant was not a jurisdictional determina-
tion, for the determination was not necessary to give the court jurisdiction over either
the subject matter or the parties; the court consequently had power to render a decree
effective upon the parties before it. But as to parties by representation, the determina-
tion that a covenant existed was a jurisdictional one: the power of the court to bind
these persons by representation lies solely in the existence of an operative agreement
whose signers constitute a class. Without the operative agreement there is no class;
without the existence of a class the court's jurisdiction is limited to the parties before
it, and it has no jurisdiction over those "represented."29
Insofar, then, as the decision holds that the defendants are bound, simply because they
were represented in the Burke case, it would seem that the decision in the Lee case can-
not be supported. It is suggested, however, that the same result, so far as the parties
before the court in the Lee case were concerned, could have been reached on a sounder
ground. The court found that the party who was the plaintiff in the Burke case was
the wife of one of the defendants in the Lee case; and that the other defendants in
the Lee case were in collusion with the Burkes.30 No use of a representative suit theory
would have been necessary to estop substantially the same party from denying in the
second suit what he had alleged in the first.
Torts-Liability of Charitable Institutions-Effect of Indemnity Insurance Policy-
[Colorado].-The plaintiff, a paying patient in a charitable hospital, sought to recover
damages for negligence in medical treatment. The defendant contended that, as a
charitable institution, it was not liable for negligence. The plaintiff replied that a
judgment against the defendant would in no way affect the charitable trust fund, for
s In the main, consent operates only as evidence that the representative was not in any
event a proper one, and that he could not have bound the "class" even if he had not consented.
Union Bank of Richmond v. Com'rs of Town of Oxford, 1i9 N.C. 214, 25 S.E. 966 (i896);
Kelley v. Milan, 127 U.S. 139 (x888); People v. Chicago, B. & I. R. Co., 247 Ill. 340, 93 N.E.
422 (IgIo). But cf. Board of Supervisors of Simpson County v. Buckley, 85 Miss. 713, 38 So.
104 (I9o5), where the presence of consent operated to permit collateral attack in what would
apparently otherwise-have properly been a representative suit.
29 See McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 9o (i916); Casswell v. Casswell, 12o Il. 377, i N.E.
342 (1887).
30Lee v. Hansberry 372 Ill. 369, 371, 24 N.E. (2d) 37, 40 (1939): "The evidence fully
justifies the finding of the Chancellor that the charges of the complaint were established."
The charges of the complaint were (Abstract of Record 1i4): "All the foregoing acts by said
parties were a part and parcel of the fraudulent scheme and conspiracy inaugurated by James
Joseph Burke that said restricted area would no longer be free of negro inhabitants.!
